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MORROW V. BANK OF AMERICA, FURTHER
DEVELOPMENTS IN CONSUMER LAW IN MONTANA,
AND THEIR IMPACT ON CONSUMERS IN THE
AGE OF COVID-19
David K. W. Wilson, Jr.*
Seamus B. McCulloch**
I. INTRODUCTION
Today, this country faces the worst financial crisis since the Great De-
pression, as the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic continues to wreak havoc on
both the nation’s and Montana’s economies. As of this writing, it is impos-
sible to say how long the crisis will last, or how bad it will become. But it is
safe to assume that many individual Montana consumers will struggle fi-
nancially as jobs are lost or cut back. Those consumers will need many
tools in their toolbox to cope with the uncertain times. Fortunately, Mon-
tana consumers have the Montana Consumer Protection Act,1 and the bene-
fit of recent decisions from the Montana Supreme Court arising from the
mortgage crisis of 2008–09.
This Article looks at the issues for consumers that arose out of the
mortgage crisis, and the case law that developed as a result. In particular,
the Article focuses on the Montana Supreme Court’s decision in Morrow v.
Bank of America,2 and how it helped reinforce the strength of consumer
protections under Montana law. This Article also looks at decisions that
followed Morrow, and how they served to further flesh out Montana con-
sumer rights. Finally, this Article discusses how the lessons learned during
the mortgage crisis can help consumers dealing with the challenges of
COVID-19 and issues arising out of the “CARES Act,”3 Congress’s most
wide-reaching attempt to mitigate some of the impacts on individuals from
government-imposed shutdowns. In particular, problems with forbearance
and credit reporting provisions of the CARES Act appear likely to lead to
future litigation.
* Partner, Morrison Sherwood Wilson & Deola, PLLP, Helena, MT.
** J.D. Candidate, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana Class of
2022.
1. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-14-101–144 (2019).
2. 324 P.3d 1167 (Mont. 2014).
3. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Publ. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281
(2020).
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II. MORTGAGE CRISIS
The mortgage crisis wreaked havoc on the United States economy in
the late 2000s, triggering a deep recession in the global economy. The mort-
gage crisis was largely caused by the rise of subprime mortgages before
2007, creating a housing bubble that burst in 2008–09. To help stop the
bleeding caused by the mortgage crisis, the government implemented sev-
eral programs falling under the umbrella of the Troubled Asset Relief Pro-
gram (“TARP”).4 The Home Affordable Modification Program (“HAMP”)5
was among these programs.
A. Subprime Mortgages
Prime mortgages represent the majority of homeowner loans.6 Borrow-
ers who qualify for a prime mortgage have good credit, they make tradi-
tional down payments, and they fully document their income.7 On the other
hand, subprime mortgages consist of applicants with high default risk, in-
cluding uncertain income and low credit scores.8 For successful subprime
mortgage applicants, the interest rate of their loan is much higher than their
counterparts who received a prime mortgage.9 Finally, near-prime mort-
gages exist on the spectrum between prime and sub-prime mortgages.10
These types of mortgages go to borrowers with better credit than subprime
borrowers but who still may not be able to accurately document their in-
come or afford traditional down payments.11
Before 2007, the growth of subprime mortgages, and to some extent
near-prime mortgages, created a housing bubble. According to the Financial
Crisis Inquiry Commission implemented by Congress, this bubble consisted
of inflated housing prices, lending practices that had “spun out of control,”
and too many homeowners taking on mortgages and debt they could not
afford.12 As a result, mortgage indebtedness in the United States nearly
doubled in less than a decade, climbing from $5.3 trillion in 2001 to $10.5
trillion in 2007.13 Likewise, “The amount of mortgage debt per household
4. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5211–41 (2018).
5. Id. § 5219a.
6. Danielle DiMartino & John V. Duca, The Rise and Fall of Subprime Mortgages, 2 ECON. LET-






12. THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, 111TH CONG., THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FI-
NAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS
IN THE UNITED STATES, at 3. (Comm. Print 2011) [hereinafter FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT].
13. Id. at 7.
2
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rose from $91,500 in 2001 to $149,500 in 2007.”14 Financial institutions
became caught up in the competition over the expansion in mortgage lend-
ing, becoming careless as they “expected that house prices would continue
to rise—thereby allowing borrowers to build up equity in their homes—and
that credit would remain easily available so that borrowers would be able to
refinance if necessary.”15
Higher rates and home prices eventually drove down demand for home
ownership. The decline began in 2006 and continued to accelerate into
2007. Fewer people were buying homes, and homes began to sit on the
market. At the same time, the high interest rates assigned to subprime bor-
rowers began to take their toll. Homeowners were unable to afford their
mortgage payments and, as a result of the weak housing market, they were
unable to sell their homes to avoid foreclosure.16 As mortgage delinquen-
cies and defaults rose, investors became frightened, pulling back from “a
range of credit markets.”17 In turn, facing stunning losses on their mort-
gages, financial institutions cut back on lending.18 The markets were
spooked, and the government at first provided no assistance.19 As a result of
the financial turmoil, the U.S. entered a deep recession.
B. Aid Programs
Against this backdrop, Congress recognized the need to implement
programs that would attempt to help both financial institutions and home-
owners. These programs were established by the Treasury Department
through TARP, while TARP itself was established by the Emergency Eco-
nomic Stabilization Act of 2008 (“EESA”).20 The EESA, meant to provide
stability to the economy, proved controversial. Many Americans did not
believe the government should be “bailing out” Wall Street.21 Despite its
controversial nature, President Bush signed EESA into law on October 3,
2008.22
14. Id.
15. Ben Bernanke, Four Questions about the Financial Crisis, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED.
RESERVE SYS., ¶ 7, https://perma.cc/LE82-FQTC (last updated Apr. 14, 2009).
16. The State of the Nation’s Housing 2008, J. CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., 2
(2008), https://perma.cc/A2H5-NNST.
17. Bernanke, supra note 15, ¶ 9.
18. Id.
19. Dina Temple-Raston, Bush Signs $700 Billion Financial Bailout Bill, NPR (Oct. 3, 2008),
https://perma.cc/3PYD-VTDL.
20. 12 U.S.C. §§ 520–61 (2008).
21. Doyle McManus, Americans Reluctant to Bail Out Wall Street, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2008),
https://perma.cc/DP7P-VBLR.
22. Temple-Raston, supra note 19.
3
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TARP was intended to “stabilize the U.S. financial system, restart eco-
nomic growth, and prevent avoidable foreclosures.”23 While TARP first al-
located $700 billion for wide-ranging economic relief, Congress subse-
quently reduced the budgetary amount to $475 billion through the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.24 Within the
Dodd-Frank Act, “approximately $250 billion was committed in programs
to stabilize banking institutions,” and $46 billion was set aside to help
homeowners avoid foreclosure.25
The Treasury Department, through TARP, oversaw many sub-
programs. Seeking to provide homeowners assistance, it launched the Mak-
ing Home Affordable (“MHA”) program in 2009.26 HAMP, the cornerstone
of the MHA program, was conceived to offer those homeowners at risk of
foreclosure reduced monthly mortgage payments that were both “affordable
and sustainable over the long-term.”27 To participate in HAMP, mortgage
servicers executed a Servicer Participation Agreement with the govern-
ment.28 In turn, the government paid incentives to the participating ser-
vicers.29 In theory, lenders would allow delinquent homeowners various
mortgage modifications, including an adjusted interest rate, an extended
term on the loan, and the forbearing or forgiving of the principle.30 Ideally,
for those homeowners eligible for HAMP, they would typically be put on a
three-month trial payment period of reduced mortgage payments, allowing
them to prove they could consistently make the new payments.31 If they
successfully did so, the mortgage lender was supposed to execute an official
modification agreement.32
In reality, it did not work out that way. Financial institutions like Bank
of America (“BOA”) gamed the system even after they settled a govern-
mental lawsuit over mortgage program abuses for $25 billion.33 Such




26. Making Home Affordable, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, https://perma.cc/VQ5U-TXUY (last up-
dated Mar. 10, 2017).
27. Making Home Affordable: Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), U.S. DEP’T OF
TREASURY, https://perma.cc/Q9Y7-4DBK (last updated Jan. 30, 2017).
28. Servicer Participation Agreement, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY (Sept. 22, 2010), https://perma.cc/
F6KK-ARAJ.
29. Making Home Affordable Handbook, MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE 103 (Sept. 1, 2011), https://
perma.cc/KX4G-DYG2.
30. Understand the Terms of Your Modification, MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE, https://perma.cc/
3C7Y-XS6C (last updated Dec. 30, 2016).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Office of Pub. Affairs, $25 Billion Agreement Provides Homeowner Relief & New Protections,
Stops Abuses, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://perma.cc/2GH7-GAFS (last updated Oct. 22, 2014).
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abuses triggered lawsuits such as Morrow in Montana and across the coun-
try.
III. ISSUES IN MONTANA – MORROW
Beginning in late 2009 or early 2010, consumer law practitioners in
Montana had a noticeable increase in calls from distressed homeowners
who were adversely affected by the mortgage crisis and were unable to
obtain loan modifications under HAMP or other programs designed by
Congress to assist folks like them. The complaints had many common ele-
ments. Among them were instances in which (1) consumers were told by
their loan servicers that they needed to “skip a payment” (or otherwise be in
default) before they could apply for a loan modification, even though under
HAMP, the standard was “reasonably foreseeable or imminent default” (not
actual default);34 (2) modification application material was routinely re-
jected by loan servicers many times for minor errors or oversites, leading to
delays in applying as defaults grew; (3) consumers rarely, if ever, spoke
with the same person, and most experienced calls with dozens of different
servicing employees, usually telling them different things than the last per-
son they talked to; (4) consumers would complete the “trial payment pe-
riod” only to be rejected for a permanent loan modification; (5) many con-
sumers faced imminent foreclosure and loss of their homes, because they
had followed servicer instructions and made the reduced payments; and (6)
foreclosures were routinely botched by an array of agents for servicers
working with high volumes of cases.
And then there were the Morrows. A.B. and Betty Morrow, like many
folks, fell in love with Montana after traveling around the state. Originally
from South Carolina, they bought land and built a home for their retirement
near White Sulphur Springs in 2006, high on a hillside with a view of the
Crazy Mountains. They first financed their home through Quicken Loans.
That loan was sold to Countrywide Financial, which, in January 2008, was
sold to BOA. The Morrows had planned to retire after selling two busi-
nesses in South Carolina. In early 2009, those sales fell through. Worried
that they may fall behind on their loans because of this drop in income, the
Morrows contacted BOA to discuss a loan modification, through the HAMP
program, in May 2009.35 The Morrows kept up with their payments until
November 2009 and claimed that in October 2009, a BOA employee in-
formed them they should intentionally miss the next month’s payment to
34. Making Home Affordable Handbook, supra note 29, at 67.
35. Morrow v. Bank of Am., 324 P.3d 1167, 1173 (Mont. 2014).
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become eligible for a modification.36 At that time, they were current on
their payments.37
On December 8, 2009, the Morrows spoke with Sunil Kumar, a BOA
representative. According to the Morrows, Kumar told them they were
“locked” for a modification with trial payments of $1,239.99.38 Kumar ex-
plained to the Morrows they would need to make the trial payments for
three to four months. At the end of that period, if the Morrows had success-
fully made the trial payments, he informed them, the modification would be
made permanent. The modification, according to the Morrows, would ex-
tend the period of the loan from 15 to 40 years and reduced the interest rate
from 4.99% to 2%. The Morrows believed the modification had been ap-
proved, subject to execution of the documents and completion of the trial
period.39
After the conversation, the Morrows immediately began to do what
they had been told to do—they started making the trial payments as told
and submitted to BOA the financial documents requested.40 Nevertheless,
by February 2010, the Morrows received a Notice of Intent to Foreclose.
When they called BOA about why they were getting such notices when
they were making the required trial payments, they were told by BOA to
just ignore the notices.41 Months followed with the Morrows continuing to
make the trial payments but receiving confusing and inconsistent informa-
tion from BOA.42 After making the trial payments for at least a year, the
Morrows were told they did not qualify for the modification because they
“appeared to reside in South Carolina,” even though they were legal re-
sidents of Montana by this point, and even though BOA had never before
raised this issue while accepting over a year’s worth of trial payments.43
The Morrows filed a lawsuit with these claims: breach of oral contract;
negligence; negligent misrepresentation; tortious breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing; fraud; and violation of the Montana Consumer
Protection Act (“MCPA”).
On summary judgment, the district court first concluded the Morrows’
breach of contract claim was barred by the Statute of Frauds. The district
court also rejected the Morrows’ claims of negligence, negligent misrepre-
sentation, and tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and fair deal-




39. Id. at 1173–74.
40. Id. at 1174.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1174–75.
43. Id. at 1175.
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concluded the Morrows’ claims for fraud and violation of the MCPA were
barred by the Statute of Frauds, because they presented alternative theories
of enforcement of the oral agreement to modify the loan.44 The Morrows
subsequently appealed.
Before the Morrow decision, the Montana Supreme Court had not yet
dealt with consumer issues arising out of HAMP. BOA, as well as other
banks and loan servicers, believed that verbal false or misleading statements
made to consumers were simply not actionable because of the Statute of
Frauds, just as the district court ruled in Morrow.45 However, other courts
around the country had begun to address similar issues. For instance, in
Ansanelli v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.,46 the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California, while noting the general rule
that a lender does not owe a borrower a duty of care when it does not
exceed the scope of its conventional role as money lender, refused to dis-
miss the complaint under Rule 12, because the complaint alleged that the
defendant went beyond that standard lender role in offering a loan modifi-
cation and engaging in the trial payment plan.47 The court also refused to
dismiss the fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims based on Chase’s
contradictory and misleading statements.48
The case of Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., also cited by the Court
in Morrow, involved facts somewhat similar to the Morrows’—the bor-
rower entered into a trial payment period and made all the payments as
promised, only to have Wells Fargo later deny the permanent, thus increas-
ing the borrower’s likelihood of default.49 Given these facts, the Seventh
Circuit’s opinion in Wigod provides a good summary of the HAMP pro-
gram under TARP, and its trial payment plan requirement:
Where a borrower qualified for a HAMP loan modification, the modifica-
tion process itself consisted of two stages. After determining a borrower was
eligible, the servicer implemented a Trial Period Plan (TPP) under the new
loan repayment terms it formulated using the waterfall method. The trial
period under the TPP lasted three or more months, during which time the
lender “must service the mortgage loan . . . in the same manner as it would
service a loan in forbearance.” Supplemental Directive 09-01. After the trial
period, if the borrower complied with all terms of the TPP Agreement—
including making all required payments and providing all required docu-
mentation—and if the borrower’s representations remained true and correct,
the servicer had to offer a permanent modification.50
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. No. C 10-03892, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32350 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2011).
47. Id. at *21–22.
48. Id. at *19–21.
49. 673 F.3d 547, 557–58 (7th Cir. 2012).
50. Id. at 557.
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The Wigod court overturned the district court’s dismissal of Wigod’s con-
sumer protection claims, ruling that she did not need to prove an “intent to
deceive” under Illinois’ Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices
Act, and that she had sufficiently alleged actual pecuniary loss, including
costs and fees, lost opportunity to save her home, and the lost ability to take
the path of an “efficient breach.”51
In another early case—and as the Montana Supreme Court would later
do in Morrow—the United States District Court for the District of Massa-
chusetts in Bosque v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.52 upheld the plaintiffs’ ability
to pursue their claims under Massachusetts’ Consumer Protection Act
(“93(A)”).53 There, the complaint alleged that Wells Fargo made deceptive,
false or misleading representations to plaintiffs about the eligibility for a
loan under HAMP.54 The court found these allegations of injury and causa-
tion sufficient to state a claim under § 93(A).55
While the Montana Supreme Court took note of these and cases from
other jurisdictions, it also relied heavily on existing Montana case law to
fashion its findings in favor of the Morrows.56 It is worth briefly reviewing
the Court’s treatment of the Morrows’ other claims under contract and tort,
as those rulings established the foundation for the MCPA finding.
The Court first addressed the Morrows’ claim that BOA’s various rep-
resentations related to the loan modification, including that they were ap-
proved for it, that it constituted an enforceable oral contract that BOA vio-
lated, and that BOA had also violated the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.57 The Court rejected these claims, basing its decision on the Statute
of Frauds, and its historical purpose which “serves to give security and cer-
tainty to titles.”58
The Court, however, reversed the district court and ruled in the Mor-
rows’ favor on all other counts. First, the Court addressed whether Bank of
America owed the Morrows a common law or fiduciary duty as a basis for
their negligence claim. In doing so, the Court reviewed Montana case law
concerning duties owed by banks, discussing the distinction between “regu-
lar” banking transactions, under which there is no duty, and ones involving
a fiduciary relationship, which would be actionable.59 In the case of the
Morrows, the Court found that a fiduciary relationship existed:
51. Id. at 575.
52. 762 F. Supp. 2d 342 (D. Mass. 2011).
53. Id. at 353–54.
54. Id. at 353.
55. Id. at 354.
56. Morrow, 324 P.3d at 1185.
57. Id. at 1175–76.
58. Id. at 1176–78.
59. Id. at 1177.
8
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The Morrows have alleged facts which, if proven, would establish that Bank
of America owed them a fiduciary duty. The Morrows claim Bank of
America advised them it would be in their best interests to deliberately miss
a payment and default on their loan. . . . Instructing a borrower not to repay
a loan, to pay less than the amount required by the loan documents, or to
ignore notices of impending foreclosure and avoid curing a default is not the
type of advice “common in the usual arms-length debtor/creditor relation-
ship.” Coles Dept. Store, 240 Mont. at 229, 783 P.2d at 934. While the
Morrows stood at arm’s length to their lender in negotiating the initial loan,
once their loan was in default they had little choice but to continue placing
their trust in the bank. It is unrealistic to say Bank of America and the Mor-
rows continued to hold equal footing throughout the negotiations.60
As a result, the Court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the Morrows’
negligence claims: “The facts alleged by the Morrows, if proven, would
demonstrate that BOA failed to provide them with accurate information
about the modification process; failed to minimize the confusion and risk
associated with the modification; and failed to timely respond and resolve
their inquiries and complaints.”61
The rest of the Court’s rulings on the Morrows’ other tort claims
flowed from the Court’s finding that BOA owed the Morrows a duty.
BOA’s actions could lead to negligent misrepresentation based on the Mor-
rows’ allegations of “directly conflicting information” about the loan modi-
fication process.62 Likewise, the Morrows were allowed to proceed with
their fraud-based claims: “The Statute of Frauds cannot ‘be used as a shield
or cloak to protect fraud, or as an instrument whereby to perpetrate fraud’
. . . [a] claim of fraud is therefore not barred by the Statute of Frauds even if
the claim relies on evidence of an oral agreement that would be unenforce-
able in contract.”63
Finally, the Court turned to the Morrows’ claims under the MCPA.
Before addressing that discussion, though, it is worth looking at the context
in which the Court addressed the law. The MCPA is supported by the Mon-
tana Constitution: “The legislature shall provide protection and education
for the people against harmful and unfair practices by either foreign or do-
mestic corporations.”64 Other states have some form of consumer protection
built into their constitutions, but none so broad as Montana.65 The Court has
consistently held that the MCPA “is broad in scope” and “being in deroga-
tion of the common law, should be liberally construed with a view to effect
60. Id. at 1177–78 (citations omitted).
61. Id. at 1179.
62. Id. at 1181.
63. Id. at 1182.
64. MONT. CONST. art. XIII, § 1(2).
65. ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 103; COLO. CONST. art. XV, § 8; IDAHO CONST. art. XI, § 8; MINN.
CONST. art. XIII, § 6; and N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. LXXXIII.
9
Wilson and McCulloch: <em>DEVELOPMENTS IN CONSUMER LAW IN MONTANA</em>
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2021
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\82-1\MON108.txt unknown Seq: 10  2-APR-21 11:16
202 MONTANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 82
its object and to promote justice.”66 Moreover, the Court has long held that
lending and borrowing are subject to the MCPA.67
In Morrow, the Court’s discussion of the MCPA was relatively brief.
The Court summarized the broad reach of the MCPA, first noting that the
MCPA “prohibits” unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of
any trade or commerce.68 The Court later affirmed that the Act applied to
consumer lending and collection and servicing of loans,69 and that a prac-
tice is considered unfair if it “offends established public policy and . . . is
either immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injuri-
ous to consumers.”70 Focusing in on the misrepresentations made by BOA
here, the Court cited the Administrative Rules of Montana, which state that
a representation is unfair or deceptive if it “states that a transaction involves
rights, remedies or obligations that it does not involve.”71 Finally, the Court
recognized the statutory threshold that a consumer may sue under the
MCPA if he or she has suffered “‘any ascertainable loss of money or prop-
erty’ as a result of an unfair practice.”72
Turning to what happened to the Morrows, the Court reviewed the
series of misrepresentations it had discussed before in relation to the other
tort claims, summarizing that the Morrows’ “default grew for more than a
year, while Bank of America repeatedly told them to ignore it, and while
the Morrows made trial payments for fourteen months.”73 The Court deter-
mined “the allegations stated by the Morrows, if true, would constitute a
practice substantially injurious to consumers” and violated the MCPA.74 In
addressing the Morrows’ claims of damages and the BOA’s claim that they
had not suffered any “ascertainable loss of money or property”, the Court
ruled that the issue of damages should be resolved by the finder of fact and
not at summary judgment.75
Morrow is significant in that it made clear that consumers may sue
banks and loan servicers, under the MCPA and in tort, for false statements
and misrepresentations about the handling of mortgage loans. Given the
number of consumers at risk during the COVID crisis of foreclosure and
66. Baird v. Norwest Bank, 843 P.2d 327, 333 (Mont. 1993); Plath v. Schonrock, 64 P.3d 984
(Mont. 2003).
67. Baird, 843 P.2d at 334 (citing Pa. Bankers Ass’n v. Com. Bureau of Consumer Prot., 427 A.2d
730, 733 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981) (for the proposition that “lending and collecting” money is trade and
commerce).
68. Morrow, 324 P.3d at 1184 (Mont. 2014), (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-103 (2019)).
69. Id. at 1184 (citing Baird, 843 P.2d at 334).
70. Id. (quoting Rohrer v. Knudson, 203 P.3d 759, 764 (Mont. 2009)).
71. Id. (citing MONT. ADMIN. R. 23.19.101(1)(l) (2014)).
72. Id. at 1184 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-133(1) (2013)).
73. Id. at 1184–85.
74. Id. at 1185.
75. Id.
10
Montana Law Review, Vol. 82 [2021], Iss. 1, Art. 8
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol82/iss1/8
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\82-1\MON108.txt unknown Seq: 11  2-APR-21 11:16
2021 DEVELOPMENTS IN CONSUMER LAW IN MONTANA 203
potentially losing their homes, Morrow provides a strong foundation for
consumer claims that may arise out of the current crisis.
IV. POST-MORROW CONSUMER DECISIONS FROM THE MONTANA
SUPREME COURT
After Morrow, the Montana Supreme Court has issued several deci-
sions that help flesh out consumer rights and consumers’ ability to obtain
damages for unfair and deceptive actions by businesses. Jacobson v.
Bayview Loan Servicing76 involved a situation much like the Morrows’.
The Jacobsons, like the Morrows, were harmed by the 2008 economic cri-
sis. They fell behind on their loan payments, and their loan servicer,
Bayview, sent them a default letter.77 Like the Morrows, they were told to
stop making payments on their loan to help them qualify for their requested
loan modification.78 The Jacobsons then went through months of hearing
conflicting information from the servicer, while loan modification applica-
tions were made at the same time the servicer scheduled—then canceled—
foreclosure sales.79
At a bench trial, the district court determined Bayview engaged in de-
ceit, negligent misrepresentation, and it violated the MCPA and the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”).80
The Court first reviewed the many misrepresentations made to the Ja-
cobsons, by Bayview, through the lens of the FDCPA.81 The Court found
Bayview’s activities were “seriously misleading misrepresentations” con-
cerning the Jacobsons’ loan and its status, and that they were material be-
cause they would “mislead the ‘least sophisticated consumer.’”82
Turning to the MCPA, the Court, relying on Morrow, found that
Bayview’s instructions—to the Jacobsons—not to make payments was a
practice “substantially injurious to consumers” and in violation of the
MCPA.83 The Court also found Bayview’s efforts to collect attorneys’ fees
and costs following the trial it lost violated the MCPA.84 The Court also
76. 371 P.3d 397 (Mont. 2016).
77. Id. at 401.
78. Id. at 402.
79. Id at 402–03.
80. Id. at 405–09.
81. The FDCPA applied in Jacobson because Bayview, as a loan servicer, was subject to the Act,
whereas the Morrows would not have had a claim under the FDCPA against Bank of America because
only entities conducting collections are subject to the Act, not the original creditor. See Jacobson, 371
P3d at 405–06.
82. Jacobson, 371 P.3d at 409.
83. Id. at 410 (quoting Rohrer, 203 P.3d at 764).
84. Id.
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ruled the violations of the FDCPA “establish state law grounds for viola-
tions of the MCPA.”85
The most significant portion of the Jacobson decision was the Court’s
treatment of damages. The Court first determined, as in Morrow, Bayview’s
actions in causing the loan balance to increase “while Bayview was making
misrepresentations to the Jacobsons” was “substantially injurious” to the
Jacobsons.86 The Court agreed with the district court’s award of damages
based on the increased interest charges caused by Bayview’s actions.87 Fi-
nally, the Court upheld the award of emotional distress damages of $50,000
under the MCPA, underscoring the broad and remedial purpose of the
Act.88 Specifically, Montana Code Annotated § 30-14-133(1) affords the
district court discretion in awarding damages as “other equitable relief that
it considers necessary or proper.” Thus, the Montana Supreme Court held
the award of emotional distress damages was appropriate.89 For Montana
attorneys representing consumers, the confirmation that a consumer may
obtain damages for emotional distress is a significant expansion of the pos-
sible remedies a prevailing consumer may obtain under the MCPA.
Puryer v. HSBC Bank,90 also involved an attempt by a borrower to
obtain a loan modification under HAMP. In Puryer, the Montana Supreme
Court reversed the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of Puryer’s
claims for breach of contract; breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing; violation of the FDCPA; and violation of the MCPA, closely fol-
lowing Jacobson in deciding the latter two issues.91 Notably for this discus-
sion, the lender had alleged that because Puryer had not made mortgage
payments and had been in default for years—based on the lender’s advice
to stop making payments according to Puryer—there was no “ascertainable
loss of money or property” triggering damages under the MCPA.92 Building
on the Court’s decision in Jacobson, the Court reversed the district court’s
dismissal of the MCPA claim for lack of damages. The district court had
declined to award damages because Puryer “failed to allege any ascertaina-
ble loss of money or property.”93 The Supreme Court disagreed: “[w]e have
rejected Lenders’ argument that under the MCPA ‘ascertainable loss of
85. Id. at 410–11.
86. Id. at 411–12.
87. Id. at 412.
88. Jacobson, 371 P.3d at 413.
89. Id. at 413.
90. 419 P.3d 105 (Mont. 2018).
91. Puryer, 419 P.3d at 115.
92. Id. at 108.
93. Id. at 115.
12
Montana Law Review, Vol. 82 [2021], Iss. 1, Art. 8
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol82/iss1/8
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\82-1\MON108.txt unknown Seq: 13  2-APR-21 11:16
2021 DEVELOPMENTS IN CONSUMER LAW IN MONTANA 205
money and property’ requires a showing of ‘actual damages’ such as a fore-
closure sale.”94 The Court went on:
Puryer’s MCPA claim alleged damages of cost and fees, attorney fees, and
ascertainable loss of money and property by executing a legal proceeding to
stop Lenders’ improper foreclosure of her property. Therefore, Puryer suffi-
ciently pled damages recognized by this Court, even if no foreclosure sale
took place, to overcome a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Taking Puryer’s alle-
gations as true, we conclude she has sufficiently pled a violation under the
MCPA.95
In other words, incurring the costs to bring a lawsuit challenging a lender’s
actions may be a sufficient “ascertainable loss of money or property” to
trigger recovery under the MCPA.
However, not all post-Morrow decisions by the Montana Supreme
Court have gone in favor of consumers.96 In Anderson v. ReconTrust,
N.A.,97 the Court upheld dismissal, under Rule 12(b)(6), of allegations
much like those made by the Morrows, not as well fleshed out in the Com-
plaint, and not as egregious.
In addressing the negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims,
the Court stated the facts “boil[ed] down to no more than that Bank of
America erroneously told them they qualified for a loan modification and
then, within a matter of days, backtracked and told them they did not.”98
The Court further noted that, unlike in Morrow, “the complaint does not
allege that Bank of America induced Andersons to take, or refrain from,
any action, or that, but for their reliance on the bank’s initial misrepresenta-
tion, they would have timely cured their default and avoided foreclosure.”99
In likewise rejecting the Andersons’ MCPA claim, the Court said the
“Andersons’ amended complaint alleges nothing similar or close to the
bank conduct at issue in Morrow.”100 The Court also rejected the Ander-
sons’ claim for damages under the MCPA, relying again on the fact that the
amended complaint did not show any reliance by the Andersons on repre-
sentations by the bank.101
In similar fashion, the Montana Supreme Court has dismissed con-
sumer claims like in Morrow, either at the motion to dismiss stage or at
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Anderson v. ReconTrust, 407 P.3d 692 (Mont. 2017); Bank of Am. v. Alexander, 389 P.3d
1020 (Mont. 2017); Graham-Rogers v. Wells Fargo Bank, 449 P.3d 798 (Mont. 2019).
97. 407 P.3d 692 (Mont. 2017).
98. Id. at 699–700.
99. Id. at 699.
100. Id. at 700.
101. Id.
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summary judgment, in Bank of America, N.A. v. Alexander,102 and Graham-
Rogers v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.103
While the post-Morrow cases dismissed by the Montana Supreme
Court may serve as a cautionary lesson in proper pleading and case selec-
tion, Jacobson and Puryer, along with Morrow, reflect that Montana’s con-
sumer protection statutes continue to be interpreted as “broad in scope and
flexible in application so as to respond to human inventiveness,” as the
Court determined almost 30-years ago.104 The strength and breadth of the
MCPA based on these recent decisions will likely serve distressed Montana
consumers well in dealing with issues arising from the economic impact of
the COVID-19 pandemic.
V. LOOKING AHEAD TO THE CURRENT CRISIS
Fast forward to 2021 and COVID-19, the country is facing a financial
crisis more dangerous and comprehensive than what it experienced during
the housing crisis. Millions of Americans have lost their jobs.105 As of this
writing, Congress and the President reached an accord on another round of
stimulus packages, including aid for struggling homeowners;106 however,
the country is facing another—more intense—wave of COVID-19 infec-
tions.107 Although it is too early to predict how things will shake out, we
can make some assumptions and apply past lessons, based in part on the
congressional assistance which was approved early in the pandemic.
A. The CARES Act
Signed into law by the President on March 27, 2020, the Coronavirus
Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (“CARES”) Act is a sweeping piece of
legislation meant to provide “fast and direct economic assistance for Ameri-
can workers, and families, small businesses, and preserve jobs for American
industries.”108 The CARES Act provided wide-ranging relief such as the
102. 389 P.3d 1020 (Mont. 2017).
103. 449 P.3d 798 (Mont. 2019).
104. Baird, 843 P.2d at 333.
105. The Employment Situation – September 2020, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (Oct. 2, 2020), https://
perma.cc/K4VU-W3KR.
106. Zach Montague, A Look at What’s in the Stimulus Package Trump Signed, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
28, 2020), https://perma.cc/77XD-3PFG.
107. Coronavirus: Why are Infections Rising Again in U.S.?, BBC NEWS (Oct. 8, 2020), https://
perma.cc/SN6A-J7HY.
108. The CARES Act Works for All Americans, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, https://perma.cc/FQJ5-
F979 (last visited Oct. 18, 2020).
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Paycheck Protection Program intended to keep small businesses afloat109
and the $1,200 Economic Impact Payment sent to qualifying taxpayers.110
1. Section 4022
One of the measures found in the CARES Act provided relief to home-
owners unable to pay their mortgages and risking foreclosure as a result.
Section 4022, “Foreclosure Moratorium and Consumer Right to Request
Forbearance,” prevented mortgage servicers from foreclosing on any home
owner who did not make their mortgage payment within a 60-day period
beginning on March 18, 2020, with one important caveat—the mortgage
loan must be federally backed.111 These loans are insured or guaranteed by
the Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”), National Housing Act, Hous-
ing, and Community Development Act of 1992, Department of Veteran Af-
fairs, Department of Agriculture, or purchased or securitized by Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, or the Federal National Mortgage Asso-
ciation—more commonly known as Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae.112 This
is a significant segment of the home-owning population—70% of mort-
gages are federally backed.113 Independent of the § 4022 moratorium, the
Federal Housing Finance Agency114 and FHA115 have continued to extend
foreclosure protections through the end of the year, extending single family
foreclosure moratoriums to those mortgages backed by Freddie Mac, Fan-
nie Mae, and the FHA through the end of 2020.
Additionally, § 4022 of the CARES Act allows mortgagees, with fed-
erally backed loans, to request forbearance on their mortgage payments due
“directly or indirectly” to the COVID-19 pandemic.116 The standard to
grant a forbearance is lax—after a borrower has submitted a request to his
or her servicer stating that he or she is experiencing financial difficulties
because of COVID-19, the servicer “shall with no additional documentation
required other than the borrower’s attestation” provide the forbearance
without appending any additional fees or penalties.117 A period of 180 days
of forbearance is then granted, which can be extended by another 180 days
109. CARES Act § 1102, 134 Stat. at 286.
110. Id. at 490.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Tara Siegel Bernard, Mortgage Relief That Comes with a $4,000 Bill, N.Y. TIMES (May 15,
2020), https://perma.cc/2TWV-CENZ.
114. FHFA Extends Foreclosure and REO Eviction Moratoriums, FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY (Aug.
27, 2020), https://perma.cc/T7CL-MCML.
115. FHA Extends Foreclosure and Eviction Moratorium for Homeowners Through Year End, U.S.
DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV. (Aug. 27, 2020), https://perma.cc/4V7Y-9PN8.
116. CARES Act § 2201, 134 Stat. at 490.
117. Id. at 490–91.
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at the request of the borrower.118 The borrower may shorten the duration of
the forbearance period.119
2. Section 4021
Section 4021 of the CARES Act, titled “Credit Protection During
COVID-19,” provides important credit protections to consumers, especially
those borrowers who request a forbearance on their mortgage loan.120 If an
accommodation is made by agreement to “defer one or more payments,
make a partial payment, forbear any other delinquent amounts, modify a
loan or contract, or any other assistance or relief granted to a consumer who
is affected by the coronavirus disease,” the furnisher of the loan or contract
must report the credit obligation as current.121 If the account was delinquent
before the covered period and an agreement to accommodate is made, the
delinquent status is maintained unless the account is brought to current (af-
ter which, it will be reported as current until the covered period ends).122
The covered period is defined as January 31, 2020, through 120 days after
the national emergency concerning COVID-19 terminates.123
3. Issues Arising from CARES Act
As the application of the HAMP program during the housing crisis
shows, just because a law gives consumers certain rights, it does not auto-
matically mean consumers will be able to avail themselves of those rights
and opportunities. For instance, while the CARES Act allows consumers to
take advantage of forbearances to avoid immediate problems, the Act does
not spell out how the amounts forborne will have to be repaid. The amounts
due do not magically go away—they will have to be repaid somehow. Each
federally backed mortgage program issued guidance on how debtors may
repay those amounts, and they include: payments of the forbearance amount
in a lump sum; addition of the missed payments to monthly payments; and
loan modification—with most of the federally guaranteed programs requir-
ing that the lender engage with the borrower at least thirty-days before the
expiration of the forbearance period.124
118. Id. at 490.
119. Id.




124. Andrew Pizor & Geoffry Walsh, Mortgage Relief for Homeowners Affected by COVID-19,
NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR. (Sept. 23, 2020), https://perma.cc/H8E6-FKFV (The National Consumer
Law Center is a great resource for current consumer issues arising from COVID-19).
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The opportunities for problems to arise for distressed consumers from
this array of potential repayment schemes is obvious, based on the exper-
iences arising from HAMP a decade ago. What if the lender refuses to mod-
ify a loan and makes the forborne amounts due in a lump sum, even after
giving the consumer the impression that he or she qualified for a modifica-
tion? What if the lender goes straight to the option of having the consumer
pay in a lump sum without offering other options?
Likewise, while § 4021 of the CARES Act provides consumers’ credit
reports must continue to report a consumer, who was current at the begin-
ning of the forbearance period, as in good standing during the forbearance
period, cases have already arisen in which servicers incorrectly reported
delinquent loans in forbearance.
A slew of complaints to date single out Wells Fargo as the main of-
fender.125 Plaintiffs allege Wells Fargo has, without permission of the bor-
rowers, placed their loans into forbearance.126 Typically, this happens
against the plaintiff’s express wishes.127 With Samara Green, for instance, a
Wells Fargo representative called her to speak about escrow payments she
was making.128 Throughout the conversation, they discussed placing her
mortgage in forbearance, which Ms. Green declined.129 When she next
spoke with Wells Fargo, she was informed her mortgage had been placed in
forbearance anyways with neither her knowledge nor consent.130 This is
largely an issue because when a loan is placed into forbearance, the bor-
rower cannot refinance.131 The complaints allege that Wells Fargo is incen-
tivized to place loans into forbearance as they receive an incentive payment
from Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae for placing borrowers in repayment of
deferral plans.132 As similar complaints continue to crop up across the
country, the lessons of Morrow may prove relevant once again.
125. Complaint Class Action, Delpapa v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., (N.D. CA Aug. 26, 2020) (No.
3:20-cv-06009) [hereinafter Complaint Class Action]; Class Action Complaint, Green v. Wells Fargo &
Co., (N.D. CA July 31, 2020) (No. 3:20-cv-5296) [hereinafter Class Action Complaint]; Plaintiff’s Orig-
inal Class Action Complaint and Application for Injunctive Relief, Forsburg v. Wells Fargo & Co.,
(W.D. VA July 23, 2020) (No. 5:20-cv-00046) [hereinafter Application for Injunctive Relief].
126. Complaint Class Action, supra note 125, ¶ 3.
127. Class Action Complaint, supra note 125, ¶ 93.
128. Id. ¶ 124.
129. Id. ¶¶ 124–25.
130. Id. ¶¶ 128–29.
131. Id. ¶ 34.
132. Complaint Class Action, supra note 125, ¶ 31; Class Action Complaint, supra note 125, ¶ 77;
Application for Injunctive Relief, supra note 125, ¶ 15.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Experience from the housing crisis showcases it will take several
months, if not years, before Montana consumer practitioners begin to see
cases arising from the CARES Act, and any subsequent relief bills that
Congress may pass. Given the high unemployment, it is also likely that
consumer practitioners will see more foreclosure related issues. With the
Morrow decision and its progeny, consumer law practitioners will have
more tools available to assist distressed consumers, especially homeowners,
in Montana through the challenging years ahead. To paraphrase the Mon-
tana Supreme Court, lenders, because of “human inventiveness,”133 in the
negative sense, will always find new ways to mistreat unsophisticated bor-
rowers. Luckily, Montana law provides flexible and wide-reaching tools to
respond to crises and protect Montana consumers.
133. Baird, 843 P.2d at 333.
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